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Global financial markets
Overview
The year end passed with few liquidity concerns and the rally
in risky asset prices that began in March 2009 was sustained
into the first few weeks of 2010.  With advanced economies
only slowly emerging from recession, monetary policy
generally remained exceptionally accommodative although a
few central banks tightened policy slightly and the scale of
central banks’ emergency liquidity support measures
continued to moderate.
From mid-January, equity prices fell, corporate credit spreads
widened and capital issuance slowed.  This was accompanied
by a further rise in medium-term government bond yields,
especially in those countries with large projected fiscal deficits.
It appeared that investors demanded additional risk
compensation to hold financial assets, including on
government bonds.  Although after the data cut-off for this
article there were renewed increases in equity prices, perhaps
suggesting that equity market risk premia subsequently fell.
Market contacts emphasised three main sources for the
increase in risk premia in late January and early February.  First,
investors became more concerned about the possible impact
of a withdrawal of the extraordinary global monetary and
fiscal policy stimuli.  Second, the size of actual and prospective
government borrowing intensified concerns about
medium-term fiscal sustainability in a number of countries.
This was most acute for Greece and some other economies in
the euro area, which contributed to a marked depreciation in
the euro.  Third, there was increased uncertainty about the
potential effects of proposals to change the structure of
prudential regulation for financial firms.
Despite the recent period of retrenchment in financial markets,
overall market functioning did not materially worsen.  There
were some signs of renewed activity in securitisation markets,
although banks continued to face funding challenges, as did
many non-banks.
Recent developments in international capital markets
Monetary policy
While monetary policies generally remained exceptionally
accommodative, some divergence began to emerge across
countries reflecting the different near-term outlook for their
economies.  In the United Kingdom, the Monetary Policy
Committee (MPC) kept Bank Rate at 0.5% and maintained the
size of its asset purchase programme financed by central bank
reserves at £200 billion — a level that was reached in late
January.  More details of the Bank’s asset purchases are
provided on pages 16–18 of this article.
Similarly, the US FOMC and the ECB Governing Council left
key policy rates unchanged.  But elsewhere, some central
banks increased policy rates (for example, in Australia, Israel
and Norway).  And the People’s Bank of China and the Reserve
Bank of India increased their reserve requirement ratios in
order to slow lending growth.
Looking ahead, forward interest rates derived from sterling,
euro and US dollar overnight index swaps (OIS) fell.  This
reflected market participants expecting policy rates in the
United Kingdom, euro area and United States to increase later
than at the time of the previous Bulletin (Chart 1).
This article reviews developments in global financial markets since the 2009 Q4 Quarterly Bulletin
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Sources:  Bloomberg and Bank calculations.
(a) Instantaneous forward rates derived from the Bank’s overnight index swap (OIS) curves.
Chart 1 Instantaneous forward interest rates derived
from OIS contracts(a)Recent economic and financial developments Markets and operations 7
The downward revision to expected policy rates might have
reflected a reassessment of market participants’ outlook for
the pace of global economic recovery.  Indeed, according to a
Bank of America/Merrill Lynch survey, global fund managers’
growth expectations fell slightly in February.  In contrast,
however, the Consensus Economics survey of economists’
expectations showed a gradual improvement in expected real
GDP growth for 2010.
An explanation for part of the fall in market interest rates may
be that uncertainty about future policy rates declined.  This
could have lowered term premia embedded in OIS rates.
Indeed, a model-based decomposition of the sterling OIS yield
curve implied that term premia fell (Chart 2).
Government bond markets
At longer horizons, sterling, US dollar and to a lesser extent
euro interest rates rose (Chart 3).  With short-term interest
rates falling, these developments led to a steepening in
international yield curves (Chart 4).
A key influence on government bond markets over the quarter
was investor nervousness about fiscal deficits in a number of
countries.  Specifically, against the background of a relatively
slow economic recovery from recession, contacts frequently
highlighted concerns about the sustainability of some
countries’ medium-term fiscal positions.  As a result, investors
demanded higher yields to absorb the sizable prospective
government bond issuance with particularly large increases in
yields on bonds issued by some euro-area economies relative
to German government bond yields (Chart 5).
Consistent with this, the cost of protection against default on
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(a) Instantaneous forward interest rates.

















Sources:  Euronext.liffe and Bank calculations.
(a) Derived from OIS rates.  For more details on how term premia can be estimated, see Joyce,
M, Lildholdt, P and Sorensen, S (2009), ‘Extracting inflation expectations and inflation risk
premia from the term structure:  a joint model of the UK nominal and real yield curves’,
Bankof England Working Paper no.360.
Chart 2 Model-derived sterling twelve-month forward




















Sources:  Bloomberg and Bank calculations.
(a) Spreads over ten-year German government bond yields.
Chart 5 Selected European ten-year government bond
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The sovereign credit default swap market
Sovereign credit default swaps (CDS) allow investors to insure
against events of default on government debt.  The market for
CDS that reference advanced economy governments has
grown over the past year and come under greater focus from
market commentators and policymakers.  This box provides an
overview of the sovereign CDS market and reviews factors that
influence traded market prices.
Sovereign CDS contracts
Sovereign CDS are similar to other CDS contracts — for
example, those referencing corporate issuers — and can be
viewed akin to an insurance contract.(1)
Specifically, one counterparty (the ‘protection seller’) agrees
to compensate another counterparty (the ‘protection buyer’)
if the reference entity experiences a so-called credit event.  For
the life of the CDS contract (sovereign CDS commonly have
maturities of five or ten years), the protection buyer pays the
seller a premium every three months.  If, however, a credit
event occurs then either party can terminate the contract,
prompting a payment from the seller to the buyer.  This
payment compensates the CDS buyer for impairments to the
value of the relevant government debt.(2) Buyers and sellers
can choose to settle what they owe either using relevant
sovereign debt obligations or via equivalent cash payments.
For sovereign CDS referencing advanced economies, a credit
event is broadly defined as the default on, or restructuring of, a
government’s debt obligations.  There are three principle credit
events:  (i)failure to pay coupons or principal;  (ii) debt
restructuring;  and (iii) a government official disclaiming the
validity of debt obligations or imposing a moratorium or
standstill, which precedes a failure to pay or restructuring.
The market for sovereign CDS
Exposures to sovereign CDS are very small relative to the size
of government bond markets.  That remains the case despite
a notable growth in turnover in sovereign CDS over the past
year (ChartA), a period in which there has been increasing
attention on public finances in a number of countries.
Sovereign CDS are traded by a wide variety of market
participants, including banks, asset management firms and
hedge funds.  Their motives vary.  For example, hedge funds,
banks and asset managers often operate on both sides of the
market, selling or buying protection when they believe prices
are attractively high or low.  Market contacts report that
UK asset managers have been notable sellers of UK sovereign
CDS protection over recent months.  It is also common to
trade the relative prices of sovereign CDS on different
countries;  for example, selling protection on one country and
simultaneously buying protection on another country to
benefit from changes in the relative creditworthiness of
sovereign issuers.
Buyers of sovereign CDS protection are commonly seeking to
hedge risk exposures, although often not simply trying to
hedge the risk that government bonds in their portfolios
default.  For example, large banks use sovereign CDS to hedge
derivative exposures to sovereign and quasi-sovereign entities
(such as central banks or supranational bodies) which do not
offer collateral against changes in the value of derivative
trades.  In addition, some asset managers use sovereign CDS as
an approximate hedge against changes in a country’s
macroeconomic outlook.  For example, a fund manager may
seek to hedge risks on a large portfolio with exposure to bonds,
equities and currencies using sovereign CDS.  This hedge does
not require an event of default to prove useful — if CDS prices
change the position can be closed at a profit or loss by trading
an offsetting CDS contract.
Factors that determine prices of sovereign CDS
contracts
Similar to corporate CDS, sovereign CDS prices should in
principle reflect investors’ perceptions of the probability of a
credit event by the referenced sovereign and the expected
recovery rate if this occurs.  Indeed, if the possibility of default
was zero a CDS contract’s price should be zero.  An implied
probability of default can be calculated directly from CDS
prices by assuming what investors’ recovery rate would be in
the event of default and that investors are risk-neutral.  For
example, based on this simplistic approach, a five-year CDS
spread of 100 basis points and a recovery rate of 40%, would
give an implied (risk-neutral) probability of default that is
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Chart A Net notional dealer exposures to sovereign
CDS contracts(a)
Sources:  DTCC and Bank calculations.
(a) The Western Europe series includes the fifteen members of the Markit iTraxx SovX Western
Europe Index, excluding Portugal and Norway.Recent economic and financial developments Markets and operations 9
Other factors are likely, however, to have a bearing on the
price of sovereign insurance.  To the extent that these factors
affect the market price, they may cause default probabilities
calculated in the simplistic way outlined above to be
overestimated.
First and foremost, buyers of protection are likely to be
risk-averse rather than risk-neutral.  If so, uncertainty about
the probability of default and/or the likely recovery rate in an
event of default would typically increase the price of
sovereignCDS (and other types of CDS).  That is because
risk-averse CDS buyers would pay extra to protect against
this uncertainty.(3)
A factor particularly relevant to sovereign CDS is the likely
depreciation of the sovereign’s domestic currency that would
accompany a credit event.  This possibility would also tend to
inflate prices because sovereign CDS are usually denominated
in a different currency.(4) So the expected domestic currency
pay-off is larger if the exchange rate is expected to depreciate
by more.
There are also some technical issues that may influence traded
CDS prices:
• The number of securities that can be used to settle CDS may
be positively related to the insurance premium because the
protection buyer can choose which debt obligations are
used.  This option has value as the cheapest bond can be
used;  thus increasing the expected pay-off.  The option is
difficult to price, but it may be higher for sovereign CDS than
other CDS if there are more eligible securities.
• If the creditworthiness of the protection seller and the
underlying sovereign are highly correlated, there may be a
low chance of the seller meeting its obligations in the event
of a sovereign default.  This would reduce the value of the
insurance.  For this reason, however, investors avoid buying
sovereign protection from banks that are domiciled in the
reference country.
• CDS prices may also be affected by the number of active
participants and liquidity in the relevant market.  This could
bias traded prices either up or down.
Market contacts suggest that some of these factors are
difficult to price and that, in practice, many traders do not
explicitly take account of all of them when trading sovereign
CDS.
(1) For more details on CDS see Bank of England Financial Stability Review, June 2001,
pages 117–40.
(2) In broad terms, it is determined by the difference between the cost of purchasing a
debt obligation of the referenced issuer and the debt’s so-called par value — what the
issuer was due to pay the bondholder at the maturity of the bond.  This is determined
via an auction process, which provides a price, or ‘recovery rate’ that applies to all
CDS contracts.  The process is overseen by the International Swaps and Derivatives
Association.
(3) A more detailed exposition of the impact of uncertainty about default probabilities
and recovery rates can be found in Pan, J and Singleton, K (2008), ‘Default and
recovery implicit in the term structure of sovereign CDS spreads’, The Journal of
Finance, Vol. 63, No. 5, October.
(4) Sovereign CDS are often denominated in US dollars, although CDS referencing
US government debt tends to be denominated in euro.
Greece — rose sharply (Chart 6).  However, as explained in
the box on pages 8–9 premia on sovereign credit default swaps
(CDS) may reflect factors other than changes in the perceived
probability of default.
Larger public sector deficits might, other things equal, in
theory be expected to push up on real interest rates or future
expected inflation (and/or compensation for uncertainty
around those components of nominal returns).  Over recent
months, medium-term forward real interest rates rose
internationally, particularly for sterling (Chart 7).  In contrast,
UK and US forward inflation rates (implied from the
difference between nominal and index-linked yields) were
little changed.
A model-based decomposition suggests that most of the
recent rise in sterling long-term forward interest rates might




















Source:  Markit Group Limited.
Chart 6 Selected European five-year sovereign CDS
premia 10 Quarterly Bulletin  2010 Q1
return required by investors to compensate them for
uncertainty about future real rates (Chart 8).(1)
Foreign exchange
Over the quarter, the largest change among the major
exchange rates was a 6% depreciation of the euro.  Since
mid-January, relative interest rate movements could not
account for the variations in the major effective exchange
rates, suggesting that other factors were influential (Chart 9).
In particular, sterling and the euro depreciated by more than
suggested by changes in interest rate differentials.
Concerns about the sustainability of some euro-area
economies’ medium-term fiscal positions may have led
investors to demand higher risk premia on assets denominated
in euro.  Consistent with this, the increase in CDS prices for
securities issued by these governments seemed to broadly
coincide with the depreciation in the euro (Chart 10).
Over the period, the US dollar and to a lesser extent the
Japanese yen appreciated.  Market contacts suggested that
these moves could have been amplified by some unwinding of
US dollar and yen-funded investments in other currencies.
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Sources:  Bloomberg and Bank calculations.
(a) The sovereign CDS premium is calculated as the average of the sovereign CDS premia of
Greece, Portugal, Spain and Italy.
Chart 10 Cumulative changes in selected European
countries’ CDS premia(a) and euro effective exchange rate




















Source:  Bank calculations.
(a) For more information on the methodology used to decompose interest rates, see Joyce, M,
Lildholdt, P and Sorensen, S (2009), ‘Extracting inflation expectations and inflation risk
premia from the term structure:  a joint model of the UK nominal and real yield curves’,
Bankof England Working Paper no.360.
Chart 8 Decomposition of sterling five-year interest
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Source:  Bank calculations.
(a) For more information on the analytics required to isolate the impact of interest rate ‘news’
on exchange rates, see Brigden, A, Martin, B and Salmon, C (1997), ‘Decomposing exchange
rate movements according to the uncovered interest rate parity condition’, Bank of England
Quarterly Bulletin, November, pages 377–89.
Chart 9 Implied contribution of interest rate ‘news’ to
cumulative changes in selected ERIs since the previous
Bulletin(a)
(1) For more details of this model, see Joyce, Lildholdt and Sorensen (2009), ‘Extracting
inflation expectations and inflation risk premia from the term structure:  a joint model

















Source:  Bank calculations.
(a) US dollar and sterling rates derived from the Bank’s government liability curves.  Euro rates
derived using the Bank’s inflation swap and government liability curves.
Chart 7  International five-year real interest rates,
five years forward(a)Recent economic and financial developments Markets and operations 11
and the Japanese yen against a broad spectrum of both
advanced and emerging market currencies since the previous
Bulletin (Chart 11).
Equities
The rally in equity prices that began in March 2009 was
initially sustained into the first weeks of 2010.  But the major
indices fell from mid-January 2010 when equity markets were
caught up in a general period of risk retrenchment, primarily
related to increased uncertainty about the sustainability of
government debt in a number of countries (Chart 12).  Similar
moves occurred in other risky asset markets;  for example,
many commodity prices also fell and speculative positions in
commodity markets were reduced.  This suggested that a
generalised increase in the risk premia demanded by investors
in risky assets may have accounted for the falls in equity prices.
The observed rise in government bond yields might, other
things equal, have also exerted some downward pressure on
equity prices via a rise in the rate at which expected future
cash flows are discounted.  The relationship between moves in
government bond yields and equity prices is discussed in a
separate article on pages 24–33 of this Bulletin.
On the other hand, an increase in expected dividend growth
could have supported equity prices and helped them end the
period broadly unchanged.  Indeed, dividend swap prices did
strengthen slightly since the previous Bulletin (Chart 13).
Corporate credit markets
Consistent with developments in equity markets, investor
appetite for corporate credit instruments continued to
strengthen through December 2009 and early January 2010
before weakening as concerns about sovereign borrowers
increased.  Nonetheless, secondary market spreads on
corporate bonds ended the period narrower (Chart 14).  And
although the cost of insuring against company defaults
generally picked up in February, corporate CDS prices
remained close to levels in late November 2009, and increased
by less than sovereign CDS prices (Chart 15).
In primary markets, corporate bond issuance was lower than
previous quarters and from mid-January the premia charged on
new issues relative to secondary market spreads widened
slightly.  Contacts said this might partly reflect the extent to
which firms intentionally raised more funds than they required
in 2009.  Over the quarter, a larger share of global bond
issuance was by lower-rated companies (Chart 16).
Contacts also noted that companies continued switching out


















Sources:  Bloomberg and Bank calculations.
Chart 11 Percentage changes in selected US dollar and
Japanese yen bilateral exchange rates since the previous
Bulletin
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(a) Indices are quoted in domestic currency terms, except for the MSCI Emerging Markets Index,
which is quoted in US dollar terms.
(b) The MSCI Emerging Markets Index is a capitalisation-weighted index that monitors the
performance of stocks in emerging markets.
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(a) From exchange-traded futures contracts.  For more information on dividend swaps, see box
on page 30 of this Bulletin.12 Quarterly Bulletin  2010 Q1
in favour of longer-term capital market funding (Chart 17).
And demand to issue sterling commercial paper to the Bank’s
purchase facility also fell further, as described on page 17.
Activity in commercial loan markets remained subdued,
despite the projected scale of loan refinancings falling due over
the coming years — particularly for sub-investment grade
firms (Chart 18).
Anecdotal evidence from the Bank’s recently published Trends
in Lending and reports from the Bank’s Agents suggested a
modest improvement in credit conditions facing borrowers,
although the availability of credit improved more for larger
companies than for smaller firms and, overall, credit conditions




















Emerging market sovereign bond spreads (left-hand scale)
Industrial country investment-grade corporates (left-hand scale)
Industrial country non-investment grade corporates (right-hand scale)
Emerging market non-investment grade corporates (right-hand scale)
Basis points Basis points
Previous Bulletin
2008 09 10
Sources:  JPMorgan and Merrill Lynch.



















Spreads between corporate and
  sovereign CDS (left-hand scale)
Corporate CDS (right-hand scale)
Sovereign CDS (right-hand scale)
2008 09 10
Basis points Basis points
+
–
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French, German, Dutch and UK iTraxx IG index constituents.  The sovereign CDS line is the
average of French, German, Dutch and UK five-year sovereign CDS, weighted using the
















Sources:  Dealogic and Bank calculations.
(a) Data for February 2010 include issuance until 19 February.
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Chart 17 Private non-financial European and












Percentage of nominal GDP(b)
Sources:  Dealogic, IMF and Bank calculations.
(a) Based on data for dollar, euro, and sterling sub-investment grade term loans issued by
US,UK and European corporates between January 2000 and February 2010.  Europe refers
to corporates from Austria, Belgium, Denmark, France, Germany, Greece, Ireland, Italy,
Luxembourg, The Netherlands, Poland, Portugal, Spain and Switzerland.
(b) GDP data from 2009–14 is based on the IMF’s October 2009 World Economic Outlook.  For
the period between 2015 and 2020, the average growth rate over the previous ten years is
used.
Chart 18 Maturity profile of sub-investment grade term
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Non-banks and the corporate loan market
Companies can access finance through a number of sources.
For example, they can issue equity, or raise debt finance from
both the bank and non-bank sectors.  But contacts report
there have been relatively few non-bank entrants to the
UK loan market over the past couple of years.  And that is
despite relatively wide prospective lending margins and a
potential advantage over competitors who are facing
increasing impairments on their existing loans.
The Bank has discussed the impediments to entering the
loan market faced by non-bank lenders with its market
contacts.  This box outlines the information the Bank 
received.
In summary, contacts suggested a range of interwoven
impediments do exist in the United Kingdom, as described
below.  HM Treasury — working closely with the Bank —
launched a Discussion Paper on non-bank lending in
January 2010.(1)
Impediments to entry in the UK corporate loan
markets
Companies can raise debt finance either through loan
agreements or by issuing debt.  Most UK lending is provided
by the banking sector.  But it could also be supplied by other
non-bank institutions, such as pension funds, insurance
companies and fund managers.  For example, in the
United States there is a well-developed market for
non-banks to lend to firms via private placements.  In addition,
non-bank loan funds existed in the United States prior to the
increased involvement of collateralised loan obligations
(CLOs) funds, notable participants from the late 1990s.
UK and European markets had little non-bank involvement
before CLOs developed.  So with the role of CLOs now
diminished somewhat, European markets are left with less
well-developed non-bank involvement.
In describing the United Kingdom’s situation, contacts cited
the following impediments to non-banks providing more loans:
• Loan structure:  Loans have a number of features that make
them less appealing to non-bank investors, particularly
those who seek to match longer-maturity liabilities.  For
example, loans are private rather than public instruments
and are often non-tradable or have restrictions on the ability
to on-sell.  In addition, a large proportion of loans are credit
facilities which, because of their liquidity provision nature
are better suited to banks than non-banks.  And loans can
also frequently be paid down early, including via refinancing,
which makes their maturity shorter, and their profile less
certain than capital market alternatives.
• Loan pricing:  Many banks provide a suite of products to
businesses, enabling them to cross-subsidise individual
products.  A range of contacts said that corporate lending
rates were often subsidised by ‘ancillary business lines’ and
that this made it difficult for non-bank entrants, without
thefull suite of products, to compete on the loan
component alone.
• Infrastructure:  Some contacts noted that the stability in
the bank-orientated nature of loan provision in the
United Kingdom for a number of years may have lessened
the impetus to invest in a more efficient loan market
infrastructure.  Contacts noted the absence of benchmark
loan indices and third-party credit ratings, both of which
exist in some form in the United States.  They thought that
the presence of both would make it easier for non-bank
institutions that invest via third-party mandates to enter the
corporate loan market.  Additional impediments mentioned
included an outdated paper-based settlement process and
the treatment of loans by many non-bank institutional
investors as part of an ‘alternative investment’ asset class.
Some contacts identified UK pension fund trustees’ reliance
on investment consultants as impeding investments in loans
as an asset class.
• Diversification:  Many contacts reported a need to invest
across European loans if the asset class was to offer
sufficient diversification of risks.  But this was said to be
impeded by differences in legal standards across Europe,
particularly bankruptcy frameworks and the uncertainties
across jurisdictions around the treatment of senior creditors.
Evaluating the current impact of the cited impediments, and
carefully assessing the costs and benefits of change is a
significant task — the impediments are interrelated and there
are a wide variety of stakeholders in both the private and
public sector.  The Treasury Discussion Paper on non-bank
lending brought together these loan-specific issues, with
related questions about access to public capital markets.  The
Treasury will lead the ongoing work on this issue, but the Bank
will remain closely involved and will continue to feed in
intelligence gathered from its market contacts.
(1) www.hm-treasury.gov.uk/fin_non_banking.htm.14 Quarterly Bulletin  2010 Q1
remained tight.  In addition, contacts noted that both the
supply of and demand for syndicated and regular loans
remained anaemic.  Moreover, despite elevated lending
margins, there continued to be few non-bank entrants to the
corporate lending market, which is discussed in the box on
page 13.
Contacts in loan markets noted that the volume of
restructurings and insolvencies remained lower than expected.
They attributed this largely to the effects of low monetary
policy rates on floating-rate coupon payments, as well as the
strength of alternative sources of funding for companies.  But
they also highlighted some forbearance by lenders, as
evidenced by a rise in the number of so-called amend and
extend deals, where borrowers agree to a maturity extension
in return for a fee and higher coupon payments.
Bank funding markets
Conditions in short-term money markets remained broadly
unchanged.  Three-month Libor-OIS spreads remained stable,
at levels just a little above their long-term averages and well
down on their peaks over recent years (Chart 19).  Libor
spreads at six months and beyond remained a little more
elevated, however, indicating an extra premium to borrow for
longer maturities.
According to contacts, a number of factors continued to
affect the cost of money market lending.  The significant
injection of central bank liquidity over the past year has led to
reduced bank demand for funding at short maturities.
Furthermore, UK-regulated entities now have a preference to
fund at maturities greater than three months following the
Financial Services Authority’s new liquidity regime published in
2009Q4.  Contacts noted in particular that the resulting
demand for longer-dated funds may have supported six-month
Libor-OIS spreads.
Some of the emergency liquidity support measures adopted by
central banks expired and others approached the end of their
lifespan over the quarter.  For example, central bank liquidity
swap lines expired (see page 20 for more details of the Bank’s
swap line with the Federal Reserve) and the Term Asset-Backed
Securities Loan Facility in the United States is due to close on
31 March 2010.  Market contacts continued to expect a further
gradual reduction of liquidity support from central banks.  The
US Federal Reserve’s decision to increase its discount rate on
19 February strengthened these expectations.
There were, however, some renewed signs of stress in
cross-currency funding markets.  This seemed to be related to
risk aversion associated with increased worries about
sovereign default risk in Europe, and Greece in particular.  In
early February the cost of swapping funds raised in euro and
sterling to US dollars via cross-currency swaps rose, although
in the context of changes over the past year the increase was
small.
The general increase in perceived sovereign risk from
mid-January was also accompanied by higher CDS premia on
bank debt (Chart 20).  This was reportedly because banking
systems still rely on support (both actual and contingent)
from governments.  Contacts also noted concerns about the
potential for banks to make losses on holdings of Greek
government debt, as well as potential difficulties for banks
using these securities as collateral with the ECB should there
be a further downgrade to Greece’s sovereign debt rating.
Separately, and in contrast, contacts noted some positive
news about the UK commercial property sector, as described in
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Sources:  Bloomberg, British Bankers’ Association and Bank calculations.
(a) Spread of Libor to equivalent-maturity OIS rates.



















Source:  Markit Group Limited.
(a) Unweighted averages of five-year, senior CDS prices.
(b) Average of Barclays, HSBC, Lloyds Banking Group, RBS and Standard Chartered.
(c) Average of Bank of America, Citi, Goldman Sachs, JPMorgan and Morgan Stanley.
(d) Average of BBVA, BNP Paribas, Crédit Agricole, Credit Suisse, Deutsche Bank, Santander,
SociétéGénérale, UBS and UniCredit.
Chart 20 Selected international banks’ CDS premia(a)At longer horizons, banks face a challenge to secure funding to
replace government-sponsored schemes which will expire over
the next couple of years.  As part of their strategy to address
this funding gap, banks issued a significant amount of senior
debt over recent months (Chart 21).  This included record
issuance from UK banks in January, although issuance was
markedly weaker in February.  And while many
government-guarantee schemes continued, some banking
sectors reduced their dependence on these.
Contacts also reported that banks were increasingly looking to
securitisation and covered bond markets to raise funds.
Covered bond issuance continued to increase;  including from
banks whose issuance was not eligible for ECB purchase.
Prospects for issuance of mortgage-backed securities also
reportedly improved.  Total issuance in the first months of
2010 remained limited (Chart 22), despite individual issues by,
for example, Lloyds Banking Group and Co-operative Bank.
Other banks were reported to be preparing for future issuance,
however, including the possibility of issues that do not give the
investor an option to sell back the debt.
However, despite recent debt issuance, contacts highlighted
that for many banks the combined pace of long-term funding
was not yet sufficient to meet refinancing needs without some
corresponding reduction in assets.  And while capital markets
Recent economic and financial developments Markets and operations 15
UK commercial property
The Bank has previously flagged exposure to the commercial
property sector as a potential risk for UK banks.(1) This box
provides an update of some recent developments.
In the United Kingdom, the Investment Property Databank
all-property capital value index rose by 1% in January 2010,
bringing cumulative growth since its trough in July 2009 to
about 10% (ChartA).
According to contacts, this principally reflected an increase in
demand for prime properties by foreign investors as well as by
domestic institutional and retail investors.  Indeed, at
£2.9 billion, data from the Association of Real Estate Funds
show that net inflows into UK commercial property funds
reached a record high in 2009 Q4 (Chart B).
Despite the recent increases, UK commercial property values
remain well below their peak in June 2007 and derivatives
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(a) Dashed line is implied property price forecast on 15 February, calculated by adjusting the
value of derivatives contracts for total returns for income returns, which are assumed to
revert to their long-run average over the next three years.
Chart A UK commercial property capital values

















Sources:  Association of Real Estate Funds and Bank calculations.
Chart B Net inflows into UK unlisted pooled property
funds
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(a) Issuance with a value no less than US$500 million equivalent and original maturity greater
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remained open for banks to issue subordinated debt, contacts
noted that banks may have little incentive to issue such
securities in light of the uncertainty about prospective changes
to prudential regulation.  Specifically, the Basel Committee on
Banking Supervision released a consultative document that
raised questions about whether new issuance would be
counted as capital going forward.
Bank of England operations
The Bank’s balance sheet continued to expand, increasing
from £235 billion at the end of the previous review period to
£247 billion at the end of the current review period.  This
expansion principally reflected purchases of public sector
assets under the Asset Purchase Facility (APF) following the
MPC’s decision on 5 November to increase the size of the
programme of asset purchases financed by the issuance of
central bank reserves by £25 billion to £200 billion.  Over the
review period, the stock of long-term repo open market
operations (OMOs) fell, reflecting reduced demand for
liquidity insurance.(1) The remainder of this section describes
the Bank’s operations over the review period in more detail.
Asset purchases(2)
In the week prior to the February 2010 MPC meeting, the
Bank met the target set by the MPC of purchasing £200 billion
of private and public sector assets financed by the issuance
of central bank reserves;  a policy first announced on 5 March
2009 and extended on 7 May, 6 August and 5 November
2009.  On 4 February 2010, the MPC voted to maintain the
stock of asset purchases financed by the issuance of central
bank reserves at £200 billion.  The Bank announced that it
would continue to purchase high-quality private sector assets
financed by the issue of Treasury bills and the Debt
Management Office’s (DMO) cash management operations, in
line with the arrangements announced on 29 January 2009.
Table A summarises asset purchases over the review period by
type of asset.(3)
Gilts
Following the MPC’s decision on 5 November to increase the
scale of the programme of asset purchases from £175 billion to
£200 billion, 15 auctions of £1.7 billion were conducted
according to a two-week cycle.  Gilts with a residual maturity
of 10–25 years and 3–10 years were purchased on the Monday
and Wednesday of the first week and gilts with a residual
maturity greater than 25 years were purchased on the Tuesday
of the following week.  With the exception of the final two
weeks of December, where no purchases were made, this cycle
was repeated in subsequent weeks until the final week in
January.
Cover in the auctions varied over the review period, averaging
4.2 in the 3–10 year auctions, 1.8 in the 10–25 year auctions
and 1.9 in auctions for gilts with a maturity greater than
25 years (Chart 23).
By the end of January 2010, £198.3 billion of gilts had been
purchased under the asset purchase programme, of which
£88.6 billion were in the 3–10 year residual maturity range,
£84.8 billion in the 10–25 year maturity range and
£24.8 billion had a maturity greater than 25 years (Chart 24).
These gilt purchases took place over 92 auctions which varied
in size up to a maximum of £3.5 billion.














(a) On 6August 2009, the short-maturity bucket changed from 5–10 years to 3–10 years.

















Sources:  Dealogic and Bank calculations.
(a) Only includes non-retained issuance, proxied by issuance that is eligible for inclusion in
underwriting league tables.
(b) Commercial mortgage-backed securities.
(c) Residential mortgage-backed securities.
(d) Asset-backed securities.
Chart 22 Global issuance of asset-backed securities(a)
(1) See Cross, M, Fisher, P and Weeken, O (2010), ‘The Bank’s balance sheet during the
crisis’ on pages 34–42 in this Bulletin, for a detailed description of the Bank’s
operations and how the Bank’s balance sheet has expanded during the crisis.
(2) The data cut-off for this subsection is 18 February.
(3) The objectives and operation of the APF are described in more detail in the 2009 Q2
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The Bank continued to lend some of its gilt holdings via the
DMO in return for other UK government collateral.  Between
1October and 31 December 2009 a daily average of
£3.3 billion was lent in this way.  Use of the facility continued
to generally be concentrated in gilts in which the Bank holds a
large proportion of the free float (the total amount of a gilt in
issue less those held by the UK Government).
Commercial paper
The Bank continued to offer to purchase sterling-denominated
investment-grade commercial paper (CP) issued by companies
that make a material contribution to UK economic activity.
As of 18 February 2010, APF holdings of CP amounted to
£0.3 billion, down from £0.6 billion as of 19 November 2009.
Gross purchases over the period were £1.2 billion, compared
with redemptions of £1.5 billion, as the Facility primarily acted
as a backstop, following temporary reductions in market
liquidity.  The majority of primary spreads in the market
remained below the spreads at which the APF offers to
purchase CP.
In the wider market, the total amount of sterling-denominated
CP outstanding for UK corporate and non-bank financial firms
fell over the review period from £4.2 billion to £2.9 billion as
issuers continued to raise longer-term issuance in the
corporate bond market and CP issuance in other currencies
(Chart 25).
Corporate bonds
The Bank’s Corporate Bond Secondary Market Scheme aims to
facilitate market-making by banks and dealers, to help reduce
illiquidity premia and so remove obstacles to corporates’
access to capital markets.  To fulfil this aim the Bank has
offered, since March 2009, to make small purchases of a wide
range of high-quality corporate bonds by reverse auctions.
On 3 December 2009 the Bank launched a consultation on
proposals for a possible extension to the Scheme through the
Bank of England Asset Purchase Facility Fund (BEAPFF)
operating as a seller, as well as a buyer, of corporate bonds.
The proposals were aimed at improving secondary market
Table A APF transactions by type (£ millions)
Week ending(a) Commercial paper Gilts Corporate bonds Total(b)
Purchases Sales
19 November 2009(c)(d) 588 177,875 1,522 179,985
26 November 2009 224 3,400 5 0 3,629
3 December 2009 0 1,701 4 0 1,705
10 December 2009 125 3,400 2 0 3,527
17 December 2009 190 1,700 0 0 1,890
24 December 2009 0 0 0 0 0
31 December 2009 25 0 0 0 25
7 January 2010 25 3,400 0 0 3,425
14 January 2010 30 1,700 10 76 1,664
21 January 2010 275 3,400 29 19 3,685
28 January 2010 200 1,700 0 8 1,892
4 February 2010 25 0 3 18 10
11 February 2010 0 0 12 2 10
18 February 2010 0 0 8 12 -4
Total financed by a deposit from the DMO(d)(e) –– 1 2 –
Total financed by central bank reserves(d)(e) 279 198,275 1,455 200,009
Total asset purchases(d)(e) 279 198,275 1,467 200,009
(a) Week-ended amounts are for purchases in terms of the proceeds paid to counterparties, and for sales in terms of the value at which the Bank initially purchased the securities.  All amounts are on a trade-day basis, rounded to
the nearest million.  Data are aggregated for purchases from the Friday to the following Thursday.
(b) Weekly values may not sum to totals due to rounding.
(c) 19 November 2009 measured as amount outstanding as at 19 November 2009.
(d) In terms of proceeds paid to counterparties less redemptions at initial purchase price on a settled basis.
(e) Data may not sum due to assets maturing over the period.
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liquidity.  The proposals received positive feedback from
market makers, other dealers and corporates.  Accordingly, on
22 December 2009 the Bank announced that it would
commence sale auctions on 8 January 2010, with the new
timetable of operations consisting of two purchase auctions
and one sale auction each week.  The Bank may also sell bonds
into tender offers initiated by the issuing firm where such sales
are consistent with the overall objectives of the programme,
including prudent risk management.
The first corporate bond sale auction received a high level of
activity, with counterparties bidding £1.2 billion in total
across every bond in the auction.  This auction coincided with
a period of heightened investor demand for corporate
bonds, and, as the first operation of its type, market
contacts noted the auction drew an elevated level of interest.
Over the proceeding auctions the level of activity moderated,
with an average of £157 million bid for by counterparties,
and £12 million sold by the Bank, in the subsequent five
operations.
Activity in corporate bond purchase operations fell towards
the end of 2009, with four consecutive weeks from
mid-December in which the Bank made no purchases.
Seasonal factors along with increased investor demand for
corporate bonds are likely causes of this fall.  Activity increased
modestly in the New Year, with an average of £94 million
offered by counterparties.
As of 18 February 2010, the Bank portfolio totalled
£1,467 million, compared to £1,522 million at the end of the
previous review period on 19 November 2009.  This fall
reflected the effect of corporate bond sales (Chart 26).
Credit Guarantee Scheme
The Bank did not make any purchases of bank debt issued
under the Credit Guarantee Scheme from the secondary
market, but stands ready to do so should conditions in that
market deteriorate.
Secured commercial paper facility
The Bank continued to offer to purchase secured commercial
paper (SCP) backed by underlying assets that are short term
and provide credit to companies or consumers that support
economic activity in the United Kingdom.(1) There has been no
use of the Facility to date, and no SCP programmes have so far
been deemed eligible.  This largely reflects a change in
market conditions since the original consultation.  Existing
asset-backed commercial paper (ABCP) programmes are now
able to fund themselves in the US ABCP market, where pricing
has largely normalised.  There is also sufficient ‘spare capacity’
in these programmes to fund further assets if required.  That
means there has not been demand to set up new conduits to
be funded by the SCP facility.
Operations within the sterling monetary framework
During the period under review, the level of reserves was
determined by (i) the level of reserves injected via asset
purchases, (ii) the reserves supplied in long-term repo OMOs,
and (iii) the net impact of other sterling (‘autonomous factor’)
flows across the Bank’s balance sheet.  Aggregate reserves rose
over the review period from £145 billion on 20 November
2009 to £155 billion on 19 February 2010, as the fall in the
stock of long-term repo OMOs was more than offset by the
increase in reserves injected via asset purchases.
The continued reduction in the outstanding stock of long-term
repo OMOs reflected reduced demand for liquidity insurance.
Indeed, all three-month extended-collateral long-term repo
OMOs over the review period were uncovered (Table B).
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Chart 25 Sterling commercial paper outstanding for
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On 8 January 2010, the Bank announced that, with
immediate effect, it would reduce the frequency of
extended-collateral three-month long-term repo operations
from twice monthly to monthly until a new permanent
designfor long-term repo operations is introduced later in
2010.(1)
The Bank continued to set two minimum bid rates for its
three-month extended-collateral long-term repo OMOs.  The
minimum bid rate for bids against routine OMO collateral
remained at the higher of the equivalent-maturity OIS rate
and Bank Rate.  For bids against the wider collateral pool, the
minimum bid rate remained 50 basis points higher than that
for routine OMO collateral.
Monthly repo operations at six, nine and twelve-month
maturities were offered against collateral routinely accepted
in the Bank’s short-term OMOs and Operational Standing
Facilities.  In contrast to the repo operations at three-month
maturity all these operations were covered (TableC).
Operational Standing Facilities
As part of the changes to the sterling monetary framework
(SMF) introduced on 5 March 2009, the Bank announced that,
if Bank Rate was set at 0.5% or below, the rate paid on the
Operational Standing Deposit Facility would be zero, while the
rate charged on the Operational Standing Lending Facility
would continue to be set at 25 basis points above Bank Rate.
As a result of the change to remunerate all reserves balances
at Bank Rate and (given the level of Bank Rate) the reduction
in the rate paid on the Operational Standing Deposit Facility to
zero, average use of the deposit facility was £0 million in each
of the maintenance periods under review.  Average usage of
the lending facility was also £0 million throughout the period.
Discount Window Facility
In October 2008, the Bank introduced a Discount Window
Facility (DWF) as part of the framework for its operations in
the sterling money markets.  The DWF is a permanent facility
to provide liquidity insurance to the banking system and
allows eligible banks and building societies to borrow gilts
against a wide range of collateral.
On 5January 2010, the Bank announced that the average daily
amount outstanding in the Discount Window Facility between
1July and 30 September 2009 was £0 million.
Table B Extended-collateral three-month long-term repo
operations
1 December 2009
On offer (£ millions) 5,000
Cover 0.30
Weighted average rate(a) 0.500
Lowest accepted rate(a) 0.500
Tail(b) 0.00
15 December 2009
On offer (£ millions) 5,000
Cover 0.12
Weighted average rate(a) 0.878
Lowest accepted rate(a) 0.500
Tail(b) 0.38
5 January 2010
On offer (£ millions) 5,000
Cover 0.32
Weighted average rate(a) 0.504
Lowest accepted rate(a) 0.500
Tail(b) 0.00
12 January 2010
On offer (£ millions) 5,000
Cover 0.59
Weighted average rate(a) 0.540
Lowest accepted rate(a) 0.500
Tail(b) 0.04
16 February 2010
On offer (£ millions) 5,000
Cover 0.85
Weighted average rate(a) 0.851
Lowest accepted rate(a) 0.500
Tail(b) 0.35
(a) Per cent.
(b) The yield tail measures, in basis points, the difference between the weighted average accepted rate and the
lowest accepted rate.
(1) The Bank’s Consultation Document of October 2008 contains further information on
the proposed new operational design for extended-collateral three-month repo
operations.
Table C Long-term repo operations
Six-month Nine-month Twelve-month
15 December 2009
On offer (£ millions) 750 400 200
Cover 3.07 4.50 5.50
Weighted average rate(a) 0.484 0.581 0.721
Lowest accepted rate(a) 0.477 0.581 0.721
Tail(b) 0.01 0.00 0.00
12 January 2010
On offer (£ millions) 750 400 200
Cover 2.89 4.50 6.25
Weighted average rate(a) 0.507 0.576 0.740
Lowest accepted rate(a) 0.491 0.553 0.740
Tail(b) 0.02 0.02 0.00
16 February 2010
On offer (£ millions) 750 400 200
Cover 3.10 3.75 2.60
Weighted average rate(a) 0.535 0.575 0.680
Lowest accepted rate(a) 0.530 0.570 0.680
Tail(b) 0.00 0.01 0.00
(a) Per cent.
(b) The yield tail measures, in basis points, the difference between the weighted average accepted rate and the
lowest accepted rate.20 Quarterly Bulletin  2010 Q1
Other market operations
Special Liquidity Scheme
The drawdown period for the Special Liquidity Scheme (SLS)
closed on 30 January 2009.  Although the drawdown window
to access the SLS has closed, the Scheme will remain in place
for three years, thereby providing participating institutions
with continuing liquidity support.
US dollar repo operations
In concert with other central banks, on 18 September 2008 the
Bank announced measures to offer dollar financing to financial
institutions funded by a swap with the Federal Reserve.  These
measures were designed to improve the liquidity conditions in
global financial markets.
The Bank initially offered US dollar financing at overnight,
one-week, one-month and three-month maturities.  In light of
reduced demand for these operations the Bank had previously
suspended all but the one-week operation.  In co-ordination
with other central banks, the Bank confirmed on 27January
2010 that its temporary liquidity swap lines with the Federal
Reserve would expire on 1 February 2010.  The one-week
operation conducted on 27January 2010 was, therefore, the
final US dollar repo operation.  Since the previous Bulletin, the
total stock outstanding has fallen from $13 million to zero.
Foreign reserves
As part of the monetary policy framework introduced by the
Chancellor of the Exchequer in 1997, the Bank of England holds
its own foreign exchange reserves in support of its monetary
policy objective.  These reserves are separate from the
Government’s foreign exchange reserves, which the Bank
manages as HM Treasury’s agent.  They are financed with
medium-term foreign currency securities issued by the Bank.
At the end of the review period, the Bank’s foreign exchange
reserves comprised £3.9 billion of assets compared to
£4 billion at the start of the review period.
Capital portfolio
The Bank holds an investment portfolio that is approximately
the same size as its capital and reserves (net of equity
holdings, eg in the Bank for International Settlements and
European Central Bank, and the Bank’s physical assets) and
aggregate cash ratio deposits.  The portfolio consists of
sterling-denominated securities.  Securities purchased by the
Bank for this portfolio are normally held to maturity;
nevertheless sales may be made from time to time, reflecting
for example, risk management, liquidity management or
changes in investment policy.
The portfolio currently includes around £3.2 billion of gilts
and £0.6 billion of other debt securities.  Over the period from
20 November 2009 to 19 February 2010, gilt purchases were
made in accordance with the quarterly announcements on
1October 2009 and 4 January 2010.
Developments in market structure
Global foreign exchange turnover
Results of the October 2009 Foreign Exchange Joint Standing
Committee survey for the UK foreign exchange (FX) market
were published on 25 January 2010, in co-ordination with five
other committees publishing similar surveys for other markets.
Overall, the results showed that compared with April 2009,
foreign exchange turnover increased in all of the main markets.
However, turnover remained below levels reported prior to the
intensification of pressures in financial markets in
Autumn 2008 (Chart 27).
The United Kingdom remained the largest centre for foreign
exchange activity, accounting for 57.6% of reported global
turnover.  Average daily turnover increased across all products
with the most significant increases in spot FX and FX swaps.
Spot FX increased by $77 billion in the United Kingdom
compared with $94 billion in the United States, while
FX swaps increased by $49 billion in the United Kingdom and
$35 billion in the United States (Chart 28).
London Stock Exchange bond trading platform for retail
investors
In response to demand from retail investors, on 1 February
2010 the London Stock Exchange launched a new electronic
order system for bonds.  Similar to arrangements for
individuals to deal in shares, the new service offers continuous
two-way pricing for trading in increments of as little as £1 for
gilts and £1,000 for corporate bonds.  Normally these
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Sources:  Australian Foreign Exchange Committee, Canadian Foreign Exchange Committee,
London Foreign Exchange Joint Standing Committee, New York Foreign Exchange Committee,
Singapore Foreign Exchange Market Committee and Tokyo Foreign Exchange Committee.
(a) Turnover figures include spot currency, outright forwards, foreign exchange swaps, currency
swaps and foreign exchange options.
(b) The Tokyo Foreign Exchange Committee survey is conducted annually, whereas the others are
conducted bi-annually.
Chart 27 Global foreign exchange average daily
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Initially, 49 gilts and ten corporate bonds are available for
trading including securities issued by a range of large
companies and a bond issued specifically for this new service






















Sources:  Australian Foreign Exchange Committee, Canadian Foreign Exchange Committee,
London Foreign Exchange Joint Standing Committee, New York Foreign Exchange Committee
and Singapore Foreign Exchange Market Committee.
(a) Tokyo is excluded because the Tokyo Foreign Exchange Committee publish their survey
annually.
(b) Outright forwards data include non-deliverable forwards for the United Kingdom.
Chart 28 Changes in foreign exchange average daily
turnover by instrument between April and
October 2009(a)